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I. INTRODUCTION
 Some National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) student-
athletes of various sports and institutions have recently been in-
structed that they are not permitted to use certain social media plat-
forms.1 The purported reasons causing universities to implement the-
se bans range from interests in image control2 to pressure from the 
NCAA to monitor and report potential NCAA infractions.3 However, 
these bans are likely unconstitutional.4 The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that a public educational institution cannot censor 
speech simply because it wishes to avoid “discomfort and unpleas-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?  J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Political 
Science, 2010, University of Georgia. I wish to thank Professor Nat S. Stern for his helpful 
comments on earlier drafts and for his guidance regarding the connection between First 
Amendment speech protections and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. I also wish to 
thank my family. Their unconditional love and support sustains me. All mistakes are  
my own. 
 1.  See Bradley Shear, NCAA Student-Athlete Social Media Bans May Be 
Unconstitutional, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2011/08/ncaa-student-athlete-social-media-bans.html.  
 2.  Id.
 3.  See Bradley Shear, Does the NCAA Understand the Legal Implications of  
Social Media Monitoring?, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (June 22, 2011),  
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2011/06/does-ncaa-understand-legal-implications.html. 
 4.  See Shear, supra note 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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antness.”5 These bans are now more noticeable and have entered into 
the public discussion in part because other students at the same pub-
lic educational institutions are not subject to the same restrictions as 
the student-athletes.6 This Note will examine the recent social media 
bans and the constitutional issues they raise when public educational 
institutions restrict NCAA student-athletes from logging on and 
speaking out. This Note will contend that those bans that are not mo-
tivated by educational concerns are in fact unconstitutional re-
strictions on student-athletes’ free speech rights. 
II. FOUNDATION OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS
A. Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
 The First Amendment speech protections afforded to students 
have received distinct treatment by the Supreme Court.7 The Court 
has noted the need for “vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms” 
in school environments in order to encourage an atmosphere of learn-
ing and the sharing of ideas.8 However, the Court has also noted the 
importance of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to furthering 
educational pursuits and has recognized the need for school officials 
to implement policies that control student behavior at schools.9 In 
fact, the Court encapsulated these competing interests in one of the 
most commonly quoted statements pertaining to free speech protec-
tions: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this 
Court for almost 50 years.”10 The Court went on to say, “On the other 
hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming 
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, con-
sistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools.”11
 The Court’s jurisprudence concerning free speech protections in 
schools has largely centered around and attempted to address the 
dynamic created by these conflicting interests. The Court has estab-
lished the general framework for free speech protections for students 
over the course of forty years and through four major cases.12
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 5.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 6.  See Shear, supra note 1.  
 7.  1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS 
AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 343-45 (2004). 
 8.  Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.479, 487 (1960). 
 9.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 343-45. 
 10.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 11.  Id. at 507. 
 12.  See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 7 (2004 & Supp. 2011).  
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 In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme Court began 
to establish what rules would be applied to determine what student 
speech or expression would be protected under the First Amendment 
and what would not. In the case, the Supreme Court considered stu-
dent symbolic speech instead of actual, verbal speech.13 A group of 
students had met outside of school and decided to wear black arm-
bands to school as a symbol of their opposition to the Vietnam War.14
The school’s principals learned of the students’ plan before they wore 
the armbands to school and implemented a policy that any student 
found wearing a black armband would be asked to remove it, and if 
the student refused, she would be suspended until she returned to 
school without the armband.15 The students, aware of the new policy, 
wore the armbands to school and were suspended after refusing to 
remove the armbands.16 The school’s policy was solely aimed at the 
nonverbal, symbolic speech in the form of wearing black armbands  
to school.  
 The Court held that the school’s policy violated the students’ free 
speech rights under the First Amendment.17 Justice Fortas, writing 
for the Court, acknowledged the powers held by school officials in re-
lation to controlling student conduct, so long as it did not violate 
those students’ constitutional rights.18 However, the Court reasoned 
that when the students wore the black armbands, it was “closely akin 
to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to com-
prehensive protection under the First Amendment.”19 The issue the 
Court faced was not whether students wholly relinquished their First 
Amendment rights protecting pure speech. That question had long 
been answered in the negative.20 The Court reiterated that “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”21
Instead, the Court was forced to consider, in the context of a unique 
situation, whether those rights were curtailed in some way due to a 
need to control student behavior and maintain school order. 
 The Court found it important to examine the nature of the stu-
dents’ speech and whether it had any adverse impact or influence on 
the school environment.22 The Court stated that the students did not 
disrupt any classroom work, incite any violent reactions, or infringe 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 13.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06. 
 14.  Id. at 504-05. 
 15.  Id. at 504.  
 16.  Id.
 17.  Id. at 514. 
 18.  Id. at 507. 
 19.  Id. at 505-06. 
 20.  Id. at 506.
 21.  Id.
 22.  Id. at 508. 
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the rights of the school or any other student.23 The district court, 
which had ruled that the students’ First Amendment rights had not 
been violated, reasoned that the school authorities were acting rea-
sonably when they implemented the ban because they were afraid of 
a potential disturbance caused by the armbands.24 The Supreme 
Court responded that “in our system, undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression.”25 Though the Court held that the students’ First 
Amendment rights had been violated and reaffirmed the existence of 
those protections on school grounds, the Court did choose to qualify 
the free speech rights of students.26 The Court stated that conduct 
that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others” would be viewed differently and 
would most likely not be constitutionally protected.27
Tinker remained the sole standard for free speech and expression 
protections until the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser28 in 1986.29 In Fraser, the Court’s decision described 
a less protective standard for student speech.30 In the case, a student 
prepared a speech nominating his friend for an office in student gov-
ernment.31 The student’s speech relied on sexual innuendo as enter-
tainment, and teachers advised the student that his speech was in-
appropriate and that he should not deliver it.32 The student ignored 
the advice, delivered the speech to approximately 600 students, and 
was subsequently suspended from school.33
 The Court distinguished this speech from the type in Tinker by 
noting that this student was suspended because he gave a lewd 
speech in front of the student body, while the students in Tinker were 
suspended for expressing a political viewpoint.34 Chief Justice Burg-
er, writing for the Court, reasoned that while this type of speech 
probably would have been protected in other (adult) forums, it was 
exactly the type of speech whose content (offensive sexual innuendo) 
was not appropriate for its forum, a school.35 This notion of speech or 
expression and the forum in which it is spoken or expressed is an im-
portant consideration in determining if the speech is protected or un-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 23.  Id.
 24.  Id.
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id. at 510. 
 27.  Id. at 513. 
 28. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 29.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 350. 
 30.  See id.
 31.  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78. 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Id. at 677. 
 34.  Id. at 685. 
 35.  Id. at 682-83. 
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protected. The Court emphasized the societal role that schools fill in 
teaching students the value of civility and the undermining nature of 
lewd and offensive speech.36 The Court also noted that the speech had 
created a noticeable disturbance in the school, but it focused mainly 
on the speech itself as opposed to the reaction the speech engen-
dered.37 Though it is slight, this is an important distinction. The Court 
pointed to the negative effect the speech had on students mostly as proof 
of the offensive quality of the speech.38 The implication is that even if 
student speech does not cause a disruption, it may still be restricted if it 
is offensive enough to the school environment.39
 Thus, the Court reasoned that because the student’s speech was 
inappropriate for the forum and not a political viewpoint (like the 
speech in Tinker), it was not protected speech.40 The Court held that 
“[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from de-
termining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as [the stu-
dent’s] would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”41
 In Hazelwood Independent School District v. Kuhlmeier,42 two 
years after Fraser, the Court addressed the issue of school-sponsored 
speech and what degree of First Amendment protection it should re-
ceive. In Hazelwood, a school principal drew the ire of students when 
he removed two articles from the school-sponsored and student-
written newspaper before the articles were to be published.43 One ar-
ticle told the story of a pregnant student, and while the story did not 
reveal the student’s identity, the principal believed that the other 
details made the student’s identity clear.44 The other article offered a 
negative view of the father of another student, and the newspaper had 
not given the father an opportunity to respond or to consent to the 
publication of the article.45
 Most importantly, the Court distinguished these circumstances 
from those found in Tinker and Fraser on the basis that those cases 
dealt with “personal” speech while Hazelwood was concerned with 
“school-sponsored . . . expressive activities.”46 Justice White, writing 
for the majority, focused on the predicament schools face when deal-
ing with student speech that could possibly be perceived as the view-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 36.  Id. at 681-86. 
 37.  Id.
 38.  Id.
 39.  Id. at 678. 
 40.  Id. at 685. 
 41.  Id.
 42.  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 43.  Id. at 262-63. 
 44.  Id. at 263. 
 45.  Id.
 46.  Id. at 271. 
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point of the school.47 Justice White described this as speech or ex-
pression that “students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”48 The 
Court reasoned that a school should be afforded greater control over 
school-sponsored speech because it should be allowed to dissociate 
itself from speech that is, among other things, inadequate, inappro-
priate, or profane.49 The Court stated that “[a] school must be able to 
set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under 
its auspices—standards that may be higher than those demanded . . . 
in the ‘real’ world—and may refuse to disseminate student speech 
that does not meet those standards.”50 Thus, even though Hazelwood
dealt with—in the Court’s opinion—a different type of student 
speech, the Court nonetheless effectively amended and shrunk the 
mostly protective standard in Tinker.
 Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided its most recent case 
involving students and free speech protections. In Morse v. Freder-
ick,51 school officials suspended a student after he displayed a banner 
that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”52 The student displayed the ban-
ner at school-sponsored activity that was attended by students and 
other members of the public.53 The Court worked through a lengthy 
discussion about the ambiguity of the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JE-
SUS.”54 The school officials argued that it was clearly a message 
meant to promote the use of drugs and thus an endorsement of an 
illegal activity.55 The Court noted that the student’s best argument 
was that the message essentially meant nothing and was merely 
“ ‘meaningless and funny.’ ”56 But, Chief Justice Roberts stated that 
even if the meaning of the phrase was debatable, it still contained an 
“undeniable reference to illegal drugs.”57 Notably, the student raised 
another argument that the dissent found persuasive. The student 
argued that even if the message did have a clear and shocking mean-
ing, he only intended it to get him on television.58 However, Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, responded by stating that 
an explanation for the student’s motive was a separate matter from 
an interpretation of the message on the banner.59 If the student’s 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 47.  Id. at 270-71. 
 48.  Id. at 271. 
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 271-72. 
 51.  551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 52.  Id. at 397.  
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id. at 400-03. 
 55.  Id. at 401-02. 
 56.  Id. at 402 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Id.
 59.  Id.
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speech does not qualify for First Amendment protection, the fact that 
the student harbored a harmless motivation does not matter.?
 The Court held that the school had not violated the student’s 
rights because the banner was speech that was not protected by the 
First Amendment.60 In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on 
the reasonableness of the principal’s actions in response to the ban-
ner.61 The Court stated that it was reasonable to interpret the phrase 
as promoting illegal drug use.62 Thus, the Court held that a principal 
may restrict a student’s speech at a school event if that speech “is 
reasonably viewed as promoting drug use.”63 The Court cited Tinker
but noted that while a dissenting opinion raised the issue of political 
speech,64 neither party had claimed that the banner expressed a po-
litical viewpoint, thus making Tinker mostly inapplicable.65 Accord-
ingly, the Court seemed to work within the more restrictive frame-
work of Fraser and reconfirmed the view that students’ free speech 
protections must be applied with an understanding of the unique na-
ture of the school environment.66 However, the Court also made an 
interesting admission, stating that “[t]he mode of analysis employed 
in Fraser is not entirely clear.”67 The Court indicated that Fraser
acknowledged that both the content of the speech and the manner of 
the speech (or its forum) must be examined when determining if the 
speech in question is protected under the First Amendment and that 
adults and children are treated differently in this context.68 Although 
the Court in Fraser did distinguish the lewd speech from the political 
armbands in Tinker, Chief Justice Roberts stated that Fraser also did 
not expressly follow the substantial disruption analysis that Tinker
supposedly required.69 The Court noted that since the banner was not 
school-sponsored speech, Hazelwood did not apply.70 Thus, Chief Jus-
tice Robert’s majority opinion did not radically change the framework 
for student speech protections under the First Amendment, but it 
opened a debate concerning what Tinker does and does not prescribe 
and what analysis Fraser actually employed.71
 Notably, the Court produced two concurring opinions in addition 
to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion. Justice Thomas, in a con-
curring opinion, stated that he approved of adding another exception 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 60.  Id. at 400. 
 61.  Id. at 401-03. 
 62.  Id. at 401. 
 63.  Id. at 403. 
 64.  Id. at 425-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id. at 402-03. 
 66.  Id. at 397. 
 67.  Id. at 404. 
 68.  Id.
 69.  Id. at 405. 
 70.  Id. at 405-06. 
 71.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 217-23 (Supp. 2011). 
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to the Tinker analysis but would have preferred to “dispense with 
Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, [he] would do so.”72 In 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, he indicated his belief that the 
Court’s decision was quite narrow.73 Justice Alito did not think the 
Court’s decision created any restrictions on political speech, nor did it 
expand any preexisting restrictions on student speech.74
B.   The Erosion of Tinker or a Standard of Deference? 
 Tinker has long been viewed as the “high-water mark” of First 
Amendment protections for student free speech.75 However, the Su-
preme Court’s decision and reasoning in Morse represented the third 
time in as many opportunities that the Court chose to apply a more 
restrictive standard of free speech protection for students.76 Instead 
of viewing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as evolving away from 
a more protective standard of student speech, some observers have 
argued it may be more helpful to understand Tinker as it has operat-
ed over time instead of how it was initially received.77 In other words, 
instead of student speech being a story of the erosion of Tinker,78 it 
has in fact always been about deference to the reasonable judgments 
of school officials.79 A recent useful example of deference towards 
school officials can be found in Christian Legal Society Chapter v. 
Martinez.80 The Court was quite deferential to the University of Cali-
fornia Hastings College of Law after it decided to reject the Christian 
Legal Society’s application to become a registered student organiza-
tion.81 The group included discriminatory membership guidelines in 
the group’s bylaws and wanted to receive the school funding and ac-
cess to school facilities that came with being a recognized student 
organization.82 In siding with the school’s decision to deny the appli-
cation, the Court reiterated that school officials may impose re-
strictions on speech that are reasonable when factors such as forum 
and the impact of the restrictions are considered.83
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 72.  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 73.  Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 74.  Id. at 422-24 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 75.  Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech 
Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008). 
 76.  See id. at 1282-88.  
 77.  Id. at 1284-88. 
 78.  Id. at 1285-88; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 79.  Nuttall, supra note 75, at 1285. 
 80.  130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 81.  Id. at 2987-91. 
 82.  Id. at 2978-81. 
 83.  Id. at 2987-91. 
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III.   FREE SPEECH FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS
A.   A Higher Standard, Hosty, or Neither? 
 The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed whether a col-
lege student’s speech should be protected more, less, or no differently 
than a high school student’s speech.84 However, in Healy v. James,85
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Central 
Connecticut State College’s decision not to allow the Students for a 
Democratic Society to be recognized as an official campus organiza-
tion.86 The Court held that the college violated the students’ First 
Amendment rights and noted that “the precedents of this Court leave 
no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for or-
der, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on col-
lege campuses than in the community at large.”87 Additionally, for 
many years after Tinker, lower federal courts consistently recognized 
a higher level of speech protection for college students—especially 
when the speech involved student-run publications.88 Repeatedly, 
lower courts have stated that a public university violates a student’s 
First Amendment speech protections when the university disciplines 
a student simply because it does not approve of the speech’s con-
tent.89 Throughout those cases, a clear theme emerged—when apply-
ing the substantial disturbance test from Tinker, discomfort or disa-
greement on behalf of the school officials could not constitute a sub-
stantial disturbance to school operations.90 However, the Supreme 
Court then decided Hazelwood and Fraser in the years following 
Tinker and Healey.?Both of those cases cut into the Tinker standard 
of significant speech protection, and Hazelwood specifically ad-
dressed a high school newspaper.91 But since Hazelwood clearly re-
duced free speech protections for high school students, observers felt 
comfortable that nothing in Hazelwood indicated the Supreme 
Court’s desire for it to spread to college newspapers.92 By all ac-
counts, those predictions proved quite accurate until, in Hosty v. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 84.  See Jessica B. Lyons, Note, Defining Freedom of the College Press after Hosty v. 
Carter, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (2006).  
 85.  408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 86.  Id. at 170-71. 
 87.  Id. at 180. 
 88.  See Lyons, supra note 84, at 1778. 
 89.  See id.
 90.  Id. at 1777-78 (discussing Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983); Schiff 
v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); and Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 
1971)). 
 91.  See supra Part II.A. 
 92.  Lyons, supra note 84, at 1780 (quoting STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., LAW OF THE 
STUDENT PRESS 56 (2d ed. 1994), for the editor’s confident assertion that it would be 
unlikely for Hazelwood to apply to college publications, as a court would have to ignore or 
overrule more than twenty years of First Amendment precedent). 
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Carter,93 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Hazelwood to 
allow the administrators of a public university to restrict student 
speech in a school-sponsored publication and discipline students for 
speech that did not merit the university’s approval.94 The court in 
Hosty offered a surprising rationale for why Hazelwood should be 
considered the appropriate analysis for restricting university-
sponsored publications.95 While the Hazelwood Court devoted sub-
stantial time and effort to considering the effect the speech would 
have on other students or whether the speech was inappropriate con-
sidering the students’ maturity level, the court in Hosty instead chose 
to force the Hazelwood analysis into a discussion distinguishing pub-
lic forums from private forums.96 The students argued that the notion 
of different types of speech being appropriate for different maturity 
levels has played a key role in determining whether to restrict stu-
dent speech.97 The students also argued that the consideration of dif-
ferent maturity levels played a key role in courts hesitating to ex-
pand high school-type restrictions to college campuses.98 However, 
the court made the fairly nonsensical claim that “there is no sharp 
difference between high school and college papers.”99 Under this rea-
soning, the next logical step is that there is no difference in maturity 
levels between high school and college students, and their speech 
should be restricted in the same ways. Not only are there decades of 
case law that disagree with this rationale, there is another area of 
First Amendment jurisprudence that closely mirrors free speech in 
how it places substantial emphasis on age and maturity level.100
B.   Establishment Clause Comparison 
 As noted above, the Court in Hazelwood based a large portion of 
its reasoning on the notion that a school official is in the best position 
to make a reasonable determination as to whether the content of a 
school-sponsored publication is either inappropriate for its reader-
ship or represents the school in a poor way.101 Aside from examining 
the official’s judgment, a key portion of that test is predicated on the 
understanding that middle and high school students are not of the 
same age or maturity level as adults, and this difference is a sensible 
reason to allow speech restrictions in certain cases.102 It should be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 93. 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 94.  Id. at 733-34. 
 95.  Lyons, supra note 84, at 1792-93. 
 96.  Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735-38. 
 97.  Id. at 734-35. 
 98.  Id.
 99.  Id. at 735; see also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1798. 
 100.  Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796-97.  
 101.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-76 (1988). 
 102.  Id. at 271-72; see also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796. 
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understood that the Court’s concern regarding student speech and 
maturity level did not spontaneously reappear in Hazelwood. On the 
contrary, the Court decided Fraser after weighing the reality that the 
particular speech involved was not necessarily inappropriate outside 
of school but that the special nature of the school environment made 
the lewd and offensive speech inappropriate and subject to re-
striction.103 This special nature is produced by several factors—
pedagogical concerns being prominent among them—but a key con-
cern is the maturity levels of middle and high school students.104
 Likewise, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has a long history 
of factoring in students’ various maturity levels when deciding 
whether the clause bars the establishment of religion at schools of 
various educational levels.105 In Tilton v. Richardson,106 the Supreme 
Court addressed whether the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 
violated the Establishment Clause because it granted federal gov-
ernment funding to some colleges that were related to churches.107 In 
the plurality opinion, the Court stated that one of the reasons it was 
less concerned about religious indoctrination at the college level was 
because college students, by virtue of their age and maturity level, 
were simply less impressionable and less likely to be caught up in 
religious indoctrination.108 Conversely, in Lee v. Weisman,109 the Su-
preme Court ruled that a middle school violated the Establishment 
Clause when it brought in clergymen to deliver nonsectarian pray-
ers.110 Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, noted that part of 
the Court’s rationale was based on widely accepted psychological re-
search showing that adolescents are often heavily influenced by peer 
pressure to conform with others’ beliefs and behaviors.111 Thus, the 
Supreme Court, with respect to another First Amendment right, has 
made a clear determination that age and maturity level should be 
weighed when determining how and when rights of students will be 
protected or restricted. More importantly, the Court has indicated 
that the conclusion this determination reaches is one of different 
treatment for high school students than college students.112 It is use-
ful to note the analogous rationales found in pre-Hosty student 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 103.  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986). 
 104.  Id.
 105.  Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796. 
 106.  403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
 107.  Id. at 674-75. The Court examined four issues in the case, determined that only 
one part of the Act was unconstitutional, and did not strike down the entire Act. 403 U.S. 
at 689. See also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796. 
 108.  Id. at 686. 
 109.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 110.  Id. at 587-90. 
 111.  Id. at 593-94. 
 112.  Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796. 
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speech jurisprudence and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.113 Fi-
nally, when Hosty is reexamined with this connection in mind, its 
reasoning appears increasingly tenuous.114
IV.   ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: A PATCHWORK DOCTRINE
 To date, the Supreme Court has not come close to addressing 
the discussion of what protections exist for online student 
speech.115 However, the Supreme Court has addressed general 
online speech, and many lower federal courts have been forced to 
decide cases involving online student speech.116 An examination of 
those cases offers some indications as to whether bans on student-
athletes from using social media are unconstitutional.  
 In Reno v. ACLU,117 the Supreme Court held that online speech is 
no different than other speech and requires full protection under the 
First Amendment.118 The suit was brought in response to the passage 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which Congress intend-
ed to effectively restrict indecent adult online speech so minors would 
not be exposed to such content while surfing the Internet.119 In sup-
port of its holding, the Court described in great detail the pervasive 
nature of the Internet in the increasingly technological and connected 
world.120 The Court concluded by stating that online speech is “ ‘the 
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed.’ ”121
 In the arena of online student speech, the lower courts have been 
left to grasp for conclusions with little to no guidance from the Su-
preme Court. Accordingly, the courts have drawn a few distinctions 
in student speech that they believe are meaningful: off-campus online 
speech versus on-campus online speech, online speech brought on 
campus by the speaker versus online speech brought on campus by 
another student, and online speech which may foreseeably be 
brought on campus versus online speech that cannot foreseeably be 
brought on campus.122
 Interestingly, the lower courts have been in near agreement that 
the Tinker substantial disruption test is the appropriate analysis for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 113.  Id.
 114.  See, e.g., id.
 115.  See, e.g., Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. 
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 
AKRON L. REV. 247, 255, 271 (2010). 
 116.  Id. at 255-62. 
 117.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 118.  Id. at 849; see also Hayes, supra note 115, at 256. 
 119.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-59. 
 120.  Id. at 849-53. 
 121.  Id. at 863 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
 122.  Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60. 
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online student speech.123 The substantial disruption test is best suit-
ed for a majority of the types of online student speech that have come 
under the courts’ review.124 Among these online student speech cases, 
restrictions on speech were upheld where the school officials could 
show that the speech either actually caused a substantial disruption 
to school operations, was very likely to cause a substantial disruption 
when the school officials intervened, or was dangerous.125 Essentially, 
the various distinctions mentioned above (on-campus online speech 
versus off-campus online speech, etc.) proved to have less to do with 
the overall analysis of the case and more to do with the way the 
courts framed the facts.126 Ultimately, while school officials may have 
had to show more cause in order to satisfy the substantial disruption 
test if another student brought the speech to campus or if the speech 
had not even been brought to campus at all, the substantial disrup-
tion test remained as the threshold question.127 Since, as described 
earlier, the Tinker test affords significant latitude to high school offi-
cials in determining what is a reasonable response to a substantial 
disruption, that threshold likely was not raised significantly higher. 
When the schools have simply stated that they did not approve of the 
student speech in question, the courts have usually turned to the 
rhetoric of strong protections for student speech found in Tinker and 
have held that the students’ rights had been violated.128 But when the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 123.  See id.
 124. A brief review of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases (where the speech did 
not occur on the internet) illustrates the utility of the Tinker test. Morse appears to apply 
narrowly to student speech that advocates illegal drug use. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 403 (2007); see Hayes, supra note 115, at 255. Hazelwood applies to school-sponsored 
student speech. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1987). Fraser
applies to “offensively lewd and indecent speech.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 685 (1985).  
 125.  Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60. See also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 
34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a student, who created digital icon on his personal 
computer that portrayed one person shooting another person and implied that the person 
being shot was the school principal, would have likely caused a substantial disruption if 
the icon had been viewed by administrators on school grounds); Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that a student caused a sub-
stantial disruption of school operations when he posted offensive and false information 
about the school principal, causing the school to shut down its computer system for five 
days); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a stu-
dent-created website, which graphically portrayed ways an algebra teacher should die, 
caused a substantial disruption because the teacher suffered emotional injuries and feared 
for her safety). 
 126.  See Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60.
 127.  See id.
 128.  Id. at 286-87. See also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
458 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that a school could not suspend a student for writing a lewd 
and offensive email about the school’s athletic director because the email did not cause any 
disturbance of school operations); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 
1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that a school could not expel a student for creating a 
website that a local news report erroneously labeled a “hit list” because the website was 
not viewed on campus and did not cause a substantial disruption); Beussink v. Woodland 
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schools argued that the speech had or would cause a substantial dis-
ruption, focusing the discussion on the reasonableness of their judg-
ment as school officials, the courts have upheld the restrictions on 
student speech.129 This clear division in arguments that do or do not 
persuade courts to enforce restrictions on student speech highlights 
two key flaws in applying Tinker to online student speech. First, 
Tinker has—over time—allowed courts to be too deferential to school 
officials to judge what type of speech will or does cause a substantial 
disruption.130 School officials are inclined to err on the side of restrict-
ing speech in favor of maintaining order and also insufficiently quali-
fied to receive such considerable deference on an issue concerning 
First Amendment rights. In West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette,131 the Supreme Court made clear that such extensive def-
erence undermines the role of courts.132 The Court stated that it 
“cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such spe-
cialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history au-
thenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”133
Second, the lower courts’ distinctions between where online speech 
originates and who causes that speech to appear on campus have 
proven unhelpful. This is likely due in large part to the reality that 
the medium for that speech is the most pervasive, universal, and eas-
ily accessible method of communication in human history. These un-
helpful distinctions illustrate why the Tinker test for online student 
speech is both outdated and insufficient.?
V. STUDENT-ATHLETES BANNED FROM USING SOCIAL MEDIA
A.   Current Landscape in College Athletics 
 Now another form of speech has emerged that is changing the way 
individuals communicate with one another, share ideas, and express 
themselves. The emergence and ubiquitous nature of social media 
has arguably impacted every facet of modern life, collegiate athletics 
included. At the same time, the world of collegiate athletics has be-
come increasingly commercialized, highly lucrative for some 
schools,134 and a boon for major conferences and broadcasting compa-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179-80 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a school could 
not suspend a student for creating a website that was very critical—and used offensive 
language—of the school’s administration solely on the basis that the website upset the 
school’s principal). 
 129.  Id.
 130.  See id.
 131.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
  132.  See id. at 640. 
 133.  Id.
 134.  See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Oct. 2011, at 80; Editorial, College Sports: Boola Boola vs. Moola Moola, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
17, 2011, at A14. 
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nies in the form of television rights agreements worth billions of dol-
lars.135 Perhaps the best example of this booming market is the newly 
launched Longhorn Network, a television network created by the 
University of Texas and ESPN that exclusively televises University 
of Texas athletics and is reportedly worth 300 million dollars.136 Ad-
ditionally, coaches’ salaries in major sports like football and basket-
ball have exploded in recent years.137 Many college football and bas-
ketball coaches earn more than one million dollars a year, and in a 
few instances, even some assistant football coaches earn salaries that 
dwarf those of high school coaches and college coaches in other, less 
visible sports.138 This relatively sudden influx of money into collegiate 
athletics has played a key role in creating stronger competition 
among coaches and schools.139 One product of this competition is the 
desire among coaches to exert the utmost control over their programs 
in hopes of winning as many games as possible.  
 Athletic department fundraising concerns are another source that 
creates demand for on-field success. In 2010, a report showed that 
only 14 of the 120 athletic departments in the Football Bowl Subdivi-
sion made a profit in the previous year.140 The report showed that the 
only two sports that made money for schools were football and men’s 
basketball and that more football programs were profitable than 
men’s basketball programs.141 However, as the study shows, only a 
few universities have football programs and men’s basketball pro-
grams that are profitable enough to pay for and exceed the costs of 
the other sports and the athletic department as a whole.142 These two 
sports and the revenues they bring in invariably come under closer 
scrutiny when school officials examine budgetary issues. Therefore, 
school administrators have an incentive to support whatever policies 
the coaches deem important for success, because that success equals 
more notoriety, more ticket sales, more alumni donations, and more 
revenue. When such large sums of money are on the line, school ad-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 135.  Pete Thamel, With Big Paydays at Stake, College Teams  
Scramble for a Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/ 
ncaafootball/in-conference-realignment-colleges-run-to-paydaylight.html?pagewanted=all.  
 136. Aaron Kuriloff & David Mildenberg, ESPN Longhorn Network Cash Tips College Sports 
into Disarray, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK. (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2011-11-10/espn-longhorn-network-cash-tips-college-sports-into-disarray.html. 
 137.  Erik Brady et al., Salaries for College Football Coaches Back on Rise, USA TODAY
(Nov. 17, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/story/2011-1117/ 
cover-college-football-coaches-salaries-rise/51242232/1. 
 138.  Gary Klein & Bill Dwyre, Auburn’s Gus Malzahn Says He’s in No Hurry to Become 
a Head Coach, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at C7. 
 139.  See, e.g., Ralph Friedgen Out at Maryland, ESPN.COM (Dec. 23, 2010, 2:29 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5938838. 
 140.  Associated Press, NCAA Report: Economy Cuts into Sports, ESPN.COM (Aug. 23, 
2010, 7:28 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5490686. 
 141.  Id.
 142.  Id.
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ministrators are inclined to allow—even actively support—student-
athlete speech restrictions. This desire is manifested in many differ-
ent policies, and one of them has been bans on social media.?
B.   Examples of Bans on Social Media 
 Several athletic departments of public universities have banned 
student-athletes within those departments from speaking through 
social media.143 The Mississippi State University men’s basketball 
team and the New Mexico State University men’s basketball team 
have implemented bans on social media.144 Both of those bans are 
still in effect.145 The University of Georgia men’s basketball program 
enforced a ban on social media for one season, but has recently lifted 
the ban.146 A larger number of public schools have banned college 
football players from using social media. Their teams are as follows: 
the University of South Carolina Gamecocks,147 the Boise State Uni-
versity Broncos,148 the University of Iowa Hawkeyes,149 and the Uni-
versity of Kansas Jayhawks.150 Admittedly, bans on only a handful of 
public university teams may not appear to indicate that similar bans 
will spread. However, that is a false reading. Social media is a recent 
phenomenon, and considering the exponential growth of attention 
that collegiate athletics demand, the possibility that bans on student-
athletes from using social media could proliferate is much more likely.  
C.   Why Student-Athletes Are Banned from Using Social Media 
 Recent studies have shown that an overwhelming majority of col-
lege students and young adults use social media websites.151 Notably, 
no public universities have banned the general student body from 
using social media. While this discrepancy in treatment among col-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 143.  Shear, supra note 1.  
 144.  Diamond Leung, Steve Alford Bans Players from Tweeting, ESPN.COM
(July 19, 2011, 9:53 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/33080/
steve-alford-bans-players-from-tweeting; Brandon Marcello, Rick Stansbury Bans Mississippi State 
from Twitter After Criticism, USA TODAY (Feb. 3, 2011, 6:36 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/ 
communities/campusrivalry/post/2011/02/mississippi-state-basketball-twitter-ban/1. 
 145.  Leung, supra note 144; Marcello, supra note 144.
 146.  Marc Weiszer, Coaches Try to Let Players Tweet Freely, DOGBYTES ONLINE, BLOG
(June 9, 2011), http://dogbytesonline.com/coaches-try-to-let-players-tweet-freely-46223/. 
 147.  David Cloninger, Spurrier Bans Team from Twitter, GAMECOCKCENTRAL.COM
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://southcarolina.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=1247470. 
 148.  Darren Rovell, Coaches Ban of Twitter Proves College Sports Isn’t About 
Education, CNBC.COM (Aug. 8, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/44058540/ 
Coaches_Ban_Of_Twitter_Proves_College_Sports_Isn_t_About_Education. 
 149.  James Steward, Ferentz Keeps Social Media on Lockdown,
KRCG.COM (Aug. 9, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.kcrg.com/sports/local/ 
Ferentz-Keeps-Social-Media-on-Lockdown-127343833.html. 
 150.  KU Notebook - Gill Bans Twitter, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 5, 2011, B6. 
 151.  Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media and Young Adults, PEWINTERNET.COM (Feb. 
3, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx. 
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lege students who are members of school athletic teams and those 
students who are not is possibly sufficient evidence of a violation of 
First Amendment rights, the reasons that school officials and college 
coaches have offered for the bans are even more transparent. 
 In August 2011, Steve Spurrier, the head coach of the South Caro-
lina Gamecocks football team, banned his players from using Twit-
ter.152 A few players had made offensive statements on their Twitter 
accounts that had begun to draw negative attention to the football 
program.153 That media attention caused Spurrier to address the is-
sue.154 First, it is noteworthy that the players’ online speech is the 
type that would be protected under the standard that the Supreme 
Court created in Reno v. ACLU.155 Spurrier, when asked by reporters 
why he had banned his players from using Twitter, said, “Well, we 
have some dumb, immature players that put crap on their Twitter, 
and we don’t need that. So the best thing to do is just ban it . . . .”156
Another example is found in a statement made by Turner Gill, head 
coach of the Kansas Jayhawks football team, also in August 2011. At 
the press conference in which he announced the ban on his football 
team from using Twitter, he stated, “The reason we decided to not al-
low our players to have a Twitter account is we feel like it will prevent 
us from being able to prepare our football program to move forward.  
Simple as that.”157
 Each school and coach has offered this type of rationale for 
banning student-athletes from using social media.158 The motiva-
tions for restricting student-athlete’s speech are easy to discern. 
Schools and coaches wish to avoid negative attention and embar-
rassment. They want student-athletes to create a positive image 
of the school and the team and are willing to censor student-
athletes to achieve this end even if it may be unconstitutional. 
They also have a strong interest in supporting policies that 
achieve on-field results at the expense of other important val-
ues—like constitutionally protected student speech. 
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 152.  Cloninger, supra note 147. 
 153.  Id.
 154.  Id.
 155.  521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). In Reno, the Court held that adult online speech should 
receive full protection under the First Amendment—even if the speech is indecent—
because it is no different than any other speech. Id.; see also supra Part IV. I state that the 
players’ online speech is the type that would be protected under Reno because, viewed in a 
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 156.  Cloninger, supra note 147 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157.  KU Notebook, supra note 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158.  See, e.g., Cloninger, supra note 147; KU Notebook, supra note 150; Rovell, supra
note 148; Steward, supra note 149. 
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 While varied, these reasons have a commonality: schools and 
coaches consider speech by student-athletes to be a privilege, not a 
right. And when that speech raises the possibility of embarrassment 
or poor play in games, many schools and coaches have chosen harsh 
bans on protected speech instead of choosing constructive policies. 
Universities and coaches should implement policies aimed at teach-
ing student-athletes that some types of speech—while constitutional-
ly protected—may not be in the best interests of the team.  
 However, there is potentially another reason why schools and 
coaches have been, and will continue to be, motivated to ban student-
athletes from using social media. They need not look any further 
than the cautionary tale that is the University of North Carolina 
men’s football team. In May 2010, then-North Carolina football play-
er Marvin Austin made a handful of late-night posts on his Twitter 
account.159 The posts were cryptic but seemed to indicate that he was 
at LIV (a posh Miami nightclub) and was enjoying bottle service.160
NCAA rules regarding student-athletes receiving improper benefits 
are detailed and strict.161 By July, the NCAA had interviewed Austin 
and other North Carolina football players regarding whether they 
received any improper benefits from school boosters or sports 
agents.162 In response, North Carolina suspended Austin indefinitely 
for the entire 2010-11 season.163 Additionally, North Carolina de-
clared seven other football players ineligible for at least one game 
and did not allow an additional six players to play in the first game 
while both the school and the NCAA continued their investigations.164
Ultimately, the NCAA found evidence that several North Carolina 
football players had received improper benefits.165 The NCAA also 
found evidence that some North Carolina football players had com-
mitted academic fraud.166 When the dust finally settled, several 
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 159.  J.P. Giglio, UNC’s Austin Posted More Than 2,400 Twitter  
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 160.  Id. “Bottle service” refers to ordering whole bottles of alcohol, often champagne. 
This practice is expensive and usually reserved for wealthy patrons. See Pascale Le 
Draoulec, Most Expensive Bottle Service, FORBES.COM (Nov. 2, 2007, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/02/vodka-clubs-bottle-forbeslife-cx_pl_1102bottleservice.html. 
 161.  NCAA Operating Bylaws, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf. 
 162.  Brooke Cain, A Timeline of the NCAA’s Investigation of  
UNC, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 28, 2011, 8:13 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/07/27/1373930/a-timeline-of-the-ncaas-investigation.html. 
 163.  Id.
 164.  Id.
 165.  Kelly Parsons, UNC Outlines Self-Imposed Football Sanctions in Response to 
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North Carolina football players lost substantial portions of their ath-
letic eligibility, head coach Butch Davis was fired, and Athletic Direc-
tor Dick Baddour resigned.167 Had Austin’s Twitter posts not caught 
the eye of the NCAA, it seems safe to assume that the NCAA’s spot-
light would not have been focused on the North Carolina football 
program, and the many other violations would have gone unnoticed  
and unreported.  
 When the NCAA sent its Notice of Allegations to North Carolina 
on June 21, 2011, one allegation in particular stood out for the pur-
poses of this Note.168 In allegation No. 9(b), the NCAA alleged: “In 
February through June 2010, the institution did not adequately and 
consistently monitor social networking activity that visibly illustrat-
ed potential amateurism violations within the football program?
???????”169 This marked the first time that the NCAA either openly de-
scribed a duty to monitor student-athletes’ social media accounts or 
alleged that a school had failed to meet its duty.170 It does not require 
any imagination to perceive the shock waves that this new policy 
sent through collegiate athletics. Was it simply a coincidence that the 
South Carolina, Kansas, and Iowa football programs all implemented 
bans on social media only a few weeks after the NCAA punished 
North Carolina for not monitoring its student-athletes’ Twitter ac-
counts? Or is it more likely that schools would rather implement 
wholesale restrictions on student speech than open themselves up to 
NCAA scrutiny? The latter seems decidedly more plausible.  
VI.   CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANS UNDER CURRENT FRAMEWORK
 Are public universities unconstitutionally restricting the First 
Amendment speech rights of student-athletes when those universi-
ties ban social media? For the purposes of this Note, this question 
will be applied within the framework of the Tinker test. There are 
many reasons why the Tinker substantial disruption standard should 
be applied instead of the other student-speech tests. First, speech 
through the medium of social media is online speech. As discussed 
above, lower federal courts have been mostly consistent in their 
judgment to apply Tinker to online speech instead of the other stu-
dent-speech tests.171 Second, while the college student-speech versus 
grade school student-speech distinction has produced a separate ju-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 167.  Butch Davis Fired by Tar Heels, ESPN.COM (July 27, 2011, 10:51 PM),  
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 171.  See supra Part IV. 
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risprudence with the application of other tests, the cases that com-
prise that area of law have largely involved school-sponsored news-
papers or student organizations seeking the official approval of the 
school.172 Additionally, there are readily identifiable complications 
with applying the frameworks of the other cases.  
 Fraser does not apply as aptly as Tinker in large part because it 
applies narrowly to a student’s lewd and offensive speech in the set-
ting of a school program or event.173 And, as discussed above, federal 
courts have consistently applied Tinker to online student speech in-
stead of Fraser.174 Morse does not apply as aptly as Tinker because it 
applies narrowly to student speech that promotes illegal drug use.175
However, it is arguable that the Hazelwood analysis (student speech 
made under the imprimatur of the school) could apply to student-
athlete speech via online social media. Accordingly, the following is a 
short discussion of potential arguments for applying Hazelwood in-
stead of Tinker.
 Schools could potentially make the argument that student-athletes 
bear the imprimatur of the school since they represent the school in ath-
letic competition. However, this argument is flawed because the speech 
that the schools are restricting is spoken through the students’ personal 
social media accounts and not speech spoken while the students are par-
ticipating in a game or when the students are speaking to the media on 
behalf of the team and the university. The student-athletes’ social media 
accounts identify the students as individuals and not as the school or 
the team, or a mouthpiece for either. Moreover, many schools and many 
coaches also have social media accounts through which they make an-
nouncements and interact with the public.176 If certain accounts should 
be considered the mouthpiece for a school or athletic program, surely 
these accounts are more reasonable examples.  
 Additionally, the schools may argue that the student-athletes bear 
the imprimatur of the school because they receive school funding in 
the form of athletic scholarships. This argument also fails because 
many college students receive funding in the form of various scholar-
ships and grants, and those students are not banned, and could not 
be banned, from using social media websites because such a policy 
would be an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amend-
ment rights. In Perry v. Sindermann,177 a state junior college profes-
sor challenged the college’s decision not to rehire him after he public-
ly criticized the school.178 The Supreme Court held that even if a  
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 172.  See supra Part III.A. 
 173.  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 174. See supra Part IV. 
 175.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
 176.  See, e.g., Weiszer, supra note 146. 
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 178.  Id. at 594-95. 
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person has no right to a governmental benefit, that person cannot be 
denied that benefit on a basis that violates her constitutionally pro-
tected right of free speech.179 The Court reasoned that “if the govern-
ment could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally 
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would 
in effect be penalized and inhibited.”180 Thus, it is incorrect to connect 
a student-athlete’s acceptance of an athletic scholarship from a public 
university with a requirement that she also forfeit First Amendment 
free speech rights.  
 Lastly, applying the Hazelwood test, as the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals did in Hosty, has been met with sufficient criticism—
applying a standard originating in a case dealing with the speech of 
students in high school as opposed to the speech of students in col-
lege—that it makes its applicability to this topic less likely.181 Thus, 
this Note analyzes the constitutionality of social media bans on stu-
dent-athletes under the Tinker test. 
A.   Social Media Bans on Student-Athletes Are Unconstitutional  
Under Tinker
 Under the substantial disruption test found in Tinker, public uni-
versities unconstitutionally restrict the First Amendment speech 
rights of student-athletes when they ban those students from using 
social media. In order for these bans to be constitutional, the schools 
and coaches would have to show that the banned speech either has 
disrupted or would substantially disrupt school operations. Tinker
has almost always been applied to school settings, used to evaluate 
whether the speech caused a substantial disruption to the institu-
tion’s educational objectives. Are the things that student-athletes 
say on their social media profiles so inciting as to cause a substan-
tial disruption of the universities’ pedagogical concerns? Or is it 
more likely that the speech will most often go unnoticed? And in the 
few instances that such speech does get noticed, it may only raise 
athletic ineligibility issues—issues separate from the pedagogical 
concerns of the school since a student-athlete’s enrollment in the school 
is unaffected by his or her continued participation in collegiate sports.  
 Additionally, there do not appear to be any instances in which 
something a student-athlete said on her social media account caused 
any protests, led to the cancellation of classes, or affected the school’s 
educational environment in any noticeable ways. Also, the student-
athletes’ social media speech has not violated any other person’s 
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 179.  Id. at 597-98.  
 180.  Id. at 597. 
 181.  Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Lyons, supra note 84, 
1796-98. 
802 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:781 
rights. In only a few instances has the student-athlete speech that 
ultimately caused a ban been speech that was offensive or lewd.182
Moreover, that type of speech is protected speech on college campuses 
when the speech does not bear the imprimatur of the school, which 
student-athlete speech does not. 
 In contrast, the public universities and coaches have usually ex-
plained that the bans were necessary because a student-athlete had 
posted something that the university found embarrassing or that the 
university or coach simply did not agree with.183 These explanations are 
very similar to the online student speech cases in which the school 
officials did not show evidence of a substantial disruption. Instead, 
the officials argued that it was not an unconstitutional restriction on 
the students’ speech because they found the speech distasteful or dis-
agreeable.184 And since the courts should defer to the school officials’ 
judgment in school matters, it was not unconstitutional when the of-
ficials restricted student speech they found inappropriate—or so the 
school officials argued.  
 In those cases, however, the courts held that when there was no 
substantial disruption, school officials violated the student’s First 
Amendment free speech rights when they restricted the speech or 
punished the students.185 Like the schools in those cases, these public 
universities and coaches are banning student-athletes from using 
social media because they do not like what a few student-athletes 
sometimes say. Like the schools in those cases, these school officials 
and coaches can only rely on deference to their judgment because 
they have not shown that a student-athlete has caused a substantial 
disruption in the school environment through social media use. 
 Under the Tinker substantial disruption test, these bans on social 
media use are unconstitutional. University officials and coaches have 
not offered an example of a student-athlete causing a substantial dis-
ruption in the school environment through social media use. None of 
the student-athletes who were banned from using social media had 
used it to infringe on another student’s rights prior to the bans being 
implemented. Clearly, these bans on social media by public universi-
ties are motivated by concerns over image control and interests in fur-
ther success in a multi-billion dollar industry—concerns that are 
glossed over with rhetoric trumpeting the privilege of being a colle-
giate athlete. Unfortunately, these bans are implemented with little 
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 182.  A review of the news articles that reported the social media bans and are cited in 
this Note reveals that only the South Carolina Gamecocks had players who tweeted 
offensive speech prior to the ban. See, e.g., Cloninger, supra note 147. 
 183.  See, e.g., Cloninger, supra note 147; KU Notebook, supra note 150. 
 184.  See cases cited supra note 128. 
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protest because, of all the parties involved, the student-athletes are in 
the weakest position to refuse these constitutional infringements.  
B.   A Narrowly-Tailored Test Is More Reasonable 
 Since it is very possible that team-wide and season-long bans are 
unconstitutional infringements on student-athletes’ First Amend-
ment rights, public universities and their athletic coaches should in-
stead choose policies that would pass a narrowly tailored test. While 
the current types of bans are likely unconstitutional under Tinker, it 
is also possible that the Tinker test is an insufficient standard for 
this uniquely twenty-first century speech. Accordingly, when decid-
ing the constitutionality of certain restrictions on social media, courts 
should decide whether those restrictions are significantly and nar-
rowly tailored so as to not constitute an undue restriction on student-
athletes’ rights of free speech.   
 Universities and coaches could combine minimal restrictions on 
social media with educational programs aimed at teaching student-
athletes about the potential pitfalls of rash or offensive social media 
speech. Administrators and coaches could choose to implement social 
media bans for shorter periods of time instead of banning use for the 
entire season. Depending on the sport, some seasons can last longer 
than five months. Instead, coaches might only ban social media use 
twenty-four hours before and after a competitive event. This “quiet 
period” would assist coaches and programs in maintaining focus and 
avoiding embarrassing distractions on the eve of a competition, while 
also not silencing student-athletes for entire semesters.  
 Another policy that could satisfy a narrowly tailored test would be 
one that only restricted the student-athletes from discussing certain 
topics or subjects on their social media accounts. Such subjects could 
include statements that advocate for either illegal activities or viola-
tions of the university’s or college’s academic honor code. Another 
subject could include sensitive information that would give athletic 
opponents a competitive edge, as such information could ultimately 
bring some degree of harm to fellow teammates. One more example is 
if a student-athlete makes embarrassing or offensive comments while 
clearly attempting to speak on behalf of the university or team. These 
examples illustrate the reasonableness and utility of a narrowly tai-
lored test because it addresses the conflict created by the dual, com-
peting interests that lie at the heart of this matter: the interest in 
allowing school administrators and coaches to employ some reasona-
ble measures of control to maintain order and the interest in protect-
ing students’ First Amendment free speech rights. 
 Additionally, this facet of a narrowly tailored test would adequate-
ly reflect what the Establishment Clause cases have borne out over 
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time—that college students are at a higher maturity level than high 
school students. College students are more mature and their speech 
should not be restricted to the same extent as high school students. 
Likewise, a policy that only restricts social media use for short, spe-
cific windows of time instead of season long bans also acknowledges 
college students’ higher maturity level. College students are mature 
enough and capable of following such guidelines. They should be al-
lowed the opportunity to exercise discretion that this narrowly tailored 
rule permits, instead of being unduly censored by season long bans.  
 A narrowly tailored test acknowledges that student-athletes—
often between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two and living away 
from home for the first time—sometimes say things that bring nega-
tive attention to their universities. It is an unfortunate reality that 
the increased notoriety of collegiate athletes makes it easier for their 
speech to garner negative attention than other students might oth-
erwise would. And, though it is rare, there have been examples of 
some student-athletes who have brought frequent embarrassment to 
themselves and to their universities without much remorse.186 A nar-
rowly tailored test would likely permit universities to ban such re-
peat offenders and reckless individuals from using social media while 
they are participating in collegiate athletics. In contrast, a narrowly 
tailored test would not allow blanket bans on student-athletes whose 
speech had never caused controversy and who may have chosen a dif-
ferent school had they been aware of the possibility of these social 
media bans before enrolling.  
 Under either the Tinker substantial disruption test or a narrowly 
tailored test, these team-wide and season-long social media bans are 
likely violations of the student-athletes’ First Amendment speech 
rights. However, adopting a narrowly tailored test to be applied to 
student-athletes’ First Amendment rights would represent a mean-
ingful effort towards protecting their speech and expression during a 
highly influential time in their lives.  
VII. CONCLUSION
 The recent bans on social media speech that public universities 
and college coaches have forced on student-athletes are likely uncon-
stitutional. The Tinker substantial disruption test only allows school 
officials to restrict student speech if the speech causes, or would fore-
seeably cause, a substantial disruption in the school environment. To 
date, no student-athlete’s social media speech has caused a substan-
tial disruption in the school environment. However, the substantial 
disruption test is likely ill-suited for speech communicated through 
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the ubiquitous and transformative social media. Social media speech 
and its effects raise issues of time and space, and those issues require 
a nuanced approach. A narrowly tailored approach would better 
serve both the student-athletes and the public universities. It would 
allow university officials and coaches to maintain an educational en-
vironment that furthers their pedagogical and extracurricular inter-
ests. More importantly, it would afford student-athletes stronger free 
speech protections than those that already exist.  
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